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military, and strategic confluence that
led to the Spanish-American War. The
question for the polity is how to design
a system that marginalizes these personal agendas and ideologies to ensure
that questions of war are indeed answered with morality, proper state behavior, and national self-interest as the
foremost considerations. Books like The
War Lovers are instructive in ensuring
we are not doomed to repeat history, or
at least that we can recognize it when
we are.
LT. COL. ROBERT GRAY BRACKNELL, U.S. MARINE
CORPS

Kabul, Afghanistan

Lieven, Dominic. Russia against Napoleon: The
True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace.
New York: Viking, 2010. 618pp. $35.95

The Napoleonic Wars are not exceptions to the rule that the victor of war
writes the history. Yet there is a strange
omission: the mythic history of Napoleon and Russia has been produced
almost wholly by the British and Germans and focuses on the events of 1813
and 1814. Yes, the disastrous French
campaign in Russia is viewed as the beginning of the end and treated as Napoleon’s mistake, but if the Russians are
offhandedly thanked for the war of attrition they fought in 1812, their participation in Western Europe in 1813 and
1814 has been downplayed. This is despite the startling fact that 650,000 Russians operated in the West in those
years and in fact trooped into Paris in
March 1814.
Even historians of Russia have not
made much of the role the Russians
played in 1813–14. They could not do
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so, of course, given the lack of archival
access. But one must also consider the
impact of the myth of 1812, promulgated in War and Peace and later reinforced by the “populism” of the Russian
Revolution. Tolstoy’s myth emphasizes
weather, great distances, Napoleon’s
overconfidence, and especially the heroism of the long-suffering Russian people, who overcame not only the French
but the incompetence of the tsar and
his advisers and generals. All this resonated well with the subsequent need of
nineteenth-century revolutionaries and
Soviets to downplay the successes of the
old regime.
Dominic Lieven’s Russia against Napoleon corrects the existing omission by
bringing to light Russia’s preparation
for and the execution of its involvement
in the diplomatic, political, and military
struggle against Napoleon from the
signing of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807
until 1814. If Lieven is to be congratulated for being the first to use Russian
sources, available only since 1990, he
deserves greater praise for resisting the
urge to make his story part of the eventual fall of the tsarist regime. One could
really not ask for more in the way of a
military history. It is exhaustively thorough, cognizant of the relationships of
intelligence, diplomacy, and domestic
politics to war, and properly limited in
scope and conclusions.
Lieven convincingly demonstrates the
real accomplishments in terms of strategy and execution of war of Alexander
I, his foreign-policy advisers, Count
Nesselrode’s Paris intelligence apparat,
and military officers. His greater
achievement, however, is his focus on
logistics and—what might seem to be a
minor matter—the role of the horse.
These are perhaps the largest and most
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interesting aspects of the Russian success story. If in 1807 the Russian state
and army were inarguably “Old Regime” compared to the West, by 1814
the Russian ability to project military
power beyond the country’s borders
was formidable. This project depended,
most of all, on the ability to move and
feed men.
To some, the role of “horsepower” in
early modern war will seem a revelation, even though the fact that Napoleon could replace men but not the
horses in Russia in 1812 is already
well-known. Lieven tells us that the

horse was the most significant military
asset of its time: “The horse fulfilled the
present-day functions of the tank, the
lorry, the aeroplane and motorized artillery. It was in other words the
weapon of shock, pursuit, reconnaissance, transport, and mobile firepower.” Interestingly, nowhere does he
say what immediately leaps to the
reader’s mind—that what the Russians
knew about horsepower mirrored what
the Soviets understood about tanks
during World War II.
KENNETH M. JENSEN

McLean, Virginia
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